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Countries frequently mentioned are the Cook Islands,
the Bahamas, Belize, Cayman Islands, Cypress, Gibraltar,
and the Turks and Caicos Islands.15
Ethical aspects
One hotly debated issue in recent years has been
whether it is ethical for attorneys to establish asset
protection trusts.  The American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional conduct specify that it is unethical to
represent a client with intent to defraud a creditor.16
Other considerations
Several risks are inherent in asset protection trusts.
One important risk is that such trusts often take the form
of discretionary spendthrift trusts with a foreign trustee
given discretion in making distributions.  The potential
risks to the settlor are obvious.
Another important consideration is cost to establish
(and maintain) the trust.17  The costs involved often run
into five figures.18
Possible political and economic instability in the
country (or a change in the attitude of the country toward
asset protection trusts) is an important additional
consideration.  Organized groups of creditors can be
expected to lobby the U.S. Government to use whatever
leverage can be exercised to discourage statutory
protection measures.
FOOTNOTES
1 See 13 Harl, Agricultural Law, Ch. 120A (1996); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual § 13.04[1] (1996).
2 See generally Marty-Nelson, “Offshore Asset
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Too,” 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 11 (1994); Mezrich, “It’s
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13 International Trusts Act 1984 § 13B(3)(a), (b).
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16 See ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
1.2(d) (1983).
17 See Marty-Nelson, supra n. 2 at 68.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the
plaintiff’s motorcycle struck a horse on the highway. The
plaintiff sued, under 510 ILCS 55/1 et seq. and a theory of
negligence, the owner of the horse and the previous owner
of the horse. The plaintiff also sued, under a theory of
negligence only, the owner of the land on which the horse
was kept. The previous owner had sold the horse to the
current owner under an installment contract under which
$170 was still owed at the time of the accident. The sale
was recorded on the Certificate of Foal Registration. The
court held that the previous owner had insufficient interest
in the horse to be liable under the statute for the accident.
The court held that liability for an animal at large on a
highway had to be based upon the statute because under
common law, landowners were not liable for damages
done by escaped animals. Therefore, an action based
solely on a theory of negligence against the defendant
landowner was properly dismissed. Douglass v. Dolan,
675 N.E.2d 1012 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned six parcels of land,
including one used for the residence and five used for
farming. Prior to filing for Chapter 12, the debtors had
transferred title to three parcels to a family partnership. A
creditor argued that the five parcels were not eligible for
the rural homestead exemption because the parcels were
located within city limits. However, the creditor failed to
provide any evidence of the location of the parcels and the
debtors testified that the parcels were all used for farming;
therefore, the court held that all parcels were eligible for
the rural homestead exemption. The creditor also argued
that the three parcels transferred to the partnership were
not eligible for the exemption because the parcels were not
owned by the debtors. The court held that the debtors’
partnership interest in the three parcels was insufficient for
eligibility for claiming a homestead exemption in the
parcels. In re Cole, 205 B.R. 382 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1997).
GRAIN STORAGE FACILITY. The debtor’s
business consisted primarily of purchasing grain for
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conditioning and resale as seed, either to third parties or
the producer of the grain. The debtor also sold farm
equipment and various farm inputs. Several creditors
sought a fifth priority under Section 507(a)(5)(A) for their
claims against the debtor as a grain storage facility. The
court held that claims from creditors who purchased, but
did not receive, farm equipment and farm inputs were not
entitled to priority because the claims did not involve
grain or the proceeds of grain. The court also denied fifth
priority to claims for unpaid wages. The court denied a
fifth priority to claims for the prepayment for seed which
was not delivered to creditors who were not producers of
grain but who sold the seed to third parties. The last group
of creditors were grain producers who sold grain to the
debtor and who were not paid. Some of the grain was
processed for seed but some was resold to third parties to
the extent not needed for the seed inventory. The court
held that Section 507(a)(5)(A) was not intended to apply
to situations where grain was sold to the storage facility
with title passing to the facility. The court assumed that
the debtor qualified as a grain storage facility, although
doubted that the debtor qualified as a grain storage
facility. The court held that, in order for a producer to be
entitled to the fifth priority, the producer must have
retained title to the grain while the grain was in the storage
facility. In re Mickelson, 205 B.R. 190 (D. N.D. 1996),
aff’g, 192 B.R. 516 (Bank. D. N.D. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had filed income tax
returns for 1989 and 1990, more than three years before
the bankruptcy petition and all assessments for those taxes
were made more than 240 days before the petition. The
IRS argued that the taxes were nondischargeable because
the tax returns were fraudulent in that not all of the
debtor’s and the debtor’s spouse’s income was claimed on
the return. The spouse had embezzled money from an
employer and had not reported the funds in income. The
spouse had always prepared the income tax returns and the
debtor signed the returns without questioning the accuracy
of the returns or knowledge that the returns were false.
The court held that the IRS failed to demonstrate that the
debtor had knowledge that the returns were false or that
the debtor’s failure to question the returns was
unreasonable. In re Blaker, 205 B.R. 326 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1996).
In 1986, the debtor filed accurate income tax returns
which included withheld taxes on wages received by the
debtor. In 1987, the debtor filed a new Form W-4,
claiming that no taxes needed to be withheld from the
wages. The debtor attended several meetings of a tax
protestor group and received advisor letters as to how to
avoid paying income tax. The debtor failed to file returns
for and pay taxes due for 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. The
IRS sent the debtor several letters in these years warning
the debtor that tax was owed on wages and that failure to
pay the taxes could subject the debtor to civil and criminal
penalties. The IRS sought to have the taxes for 1987,
1988, 1989, and 1990 declared nondischargeable for
willful attempt to evade payment of taxes. The court held
that the evidence demonstrated that the debtor understood
the income tax return filing and tax payment requirements
in pre-1987 years and that the decision to not file and pay
the taxes was a willful attempt to avoid payment of the
taxes, making the taxes nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
In re El-Swaify, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,332
(Bankr. D. Hawaii 1997).
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case in
August 1991 and did not file income tax returns during the
case for 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995. The plan was
confirmed in 1992 and the debtor was current in all plan
payments. The court had issued a general order in 1993
requiring all debtors to file post-petition income tax
returns. The court held that the failure to file post-petition
income tax returns was sufficient grounds for dismissal of
the case. In re Koval, 205 B.R. 72 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1996).
ESTATE PROPERTY . The debtor filed for
bankruptcy in September 1995 and filed the 1995 tax
return in January 1996, claiming a refund. The trustee
argued that a prorated portion of the   refund was estate
property, equal to the proportion of pre- and post-
bankruptcy days in the 1995 tax year. The debtor argued
that the refund was not estate property because no refund
was due when the petition was filed. The court held that
the prorated portion of the refund was estate property. The
case makes no mention of the effect of electing to end the
tax year on the petition date, but the case raises another
issue for consideration when determining whether that
election would be beneficial to a debtor. In re Dussing,
205 B.R. 332 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
JURISDICTION. The debtors included individuals
and the partnership owned by the individuals. The debtor
made the election, under I.R.C § 1398, to terminate their
tax year as of the date of the bankruptcy petition. The
debtors listed claims by the IRS for the pre-petition tax
year and also identified the amount of post-petition taxes
due for the second short tax year. The IRS disputed the
pre-petition claim and also disputed the amount of post-
petition tax due. The debtors sought a determination of the
pre- and post-petition tax liabilities. The IRS objected,
arguing that the Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction over
the post-petition taxes because the taxes were the personal
liability of the debtors and did not affect the bankruptcy
estate. The court noted that, under the plan, the post-
petition taxes were to be paid from a fund set up to make
plan payments. The court held that it had jurisdiction,
under Section 505(a), because the amount of post-petition
taxes would affect the plan payments and were a personal
liability of the debtors. In re Schmidt, 205 B.R. 394
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
SETOFF. The debtors operated a reforestation
business which reforested land under contracts with the
USDA. In order to finance their operations, the debtors
assigned these contracts to a third party lender. The IRS
filed a notice of setoff with the USDA to setoff the
amounts owed to the debtors against tax deficiency claims
filed by the IRS in the debtors' bankruptcy case. The IRS
also sought turnover of amounts paid to the lender. The
court held that the assignments of the contracts were valid
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but that financing statement filed by the lender as to the
contracts were not valid as against the IRS; therefore, the
IRS could setoff amounts due under the contracts even
though the contracts had been assigned and pledged as
security. However, the court also held that the IRS could
not recover amounts already paid to the assignee.  In re
Medina, 205 B.R. 216 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1996), aff’g on
point, 177 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D. Or. 1994).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations which include the popcorn endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 17103 (April 9, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the Safflower seed endorsement in the Common
Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement
provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg.
17758 (April 11, 1997).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
provided for establishment and funding of trusts for the
decedent’s nieces, with remainders to a charitable
foundation. The trust provided that the trustee had the
discretion to allocate items of income and expense to
income or principal. The trust sold some assets and
realized taxable gain on the sale. The trustee allocated the
gains to principal and sought an I.R.C. § 642(c) charitable
set aside deduction for the amounts allocated to principal.
The IRS ruled that, because the trustee had the power to
allocate items of income to principal or income, no
charitable set aside deduction was allowed. Ltr. Rul.
9714001, Dec. 5, 1996.
The taxpayer owned a farm which was rented out to
third parties, except for the residence. The rent was paid in
cash and was based on a percentage of the crop produced.
The taxpayer had established a private foundation which
was exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The
taxpayer served on the foundation’s board of directors and
was an officer of the foundation. The taxpayer transferred
the entire farm to the foundation, reserving a life estate.
The taxpayer planned to abstain from all foundation board
of director actions involving the farm. The IRS ruled that
the transfer was eligible for an income tax charitable
deduction and a gift tax charitable deduction based on the
value of the remainder interest held by the foundation.
Ltr. Rul. 9714017, Dec. 30, 1996.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The taxpayer’s
parent’s will in 1984 established a trust for the surviving
spouse as sole income beneficiary. The taxpayer had a
remainder interest in the trust contingent upon surviving
the beneficiary. The taxpayer wanted to disclaim any
income interest in the remainder of the trust. The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer would not be effective because it
was not made within nine months after the trust was
created in 1984. The IRS also ruled that the disclaimer
resulted in a gift to the other remainder holders and that
the value of the disclaimed portion was subject to GSTT
when the trust principal passed to the taxpayer’s children.
Ltr. Rul. 9714030, Jan. 7, 1997.
The decedent’s spouse died in May 1986 and the will
provided for most of the estate to pass to the decedent.
The decedent had discussed with attorneys the possibility
of renouncing all or part of the bequest but no disclaimer
in writing was executed. The predeceased spouse’s
executor paid some of the decedent’s nursing home
expenses from a joint bank account in the names of the
predeceased spouse and the executor. The bank account
funds were community property. The decedent died in
January 1987 and the heirs obtained a court order that the
decedent’s discussion with attorneys about disclaiming the
bequest from the predeceased spouse was an effective
renunciation of two-sevenths of the bequest. The court
held that the decedent’s disclaimer of the bequest was not
effective for federal estate tax purposes because the
disclaimer could not be made by the decedent’s heirs.
Under La. Civil Code art. 1007, heirs have the authority to
accept a bequest for a decedent, but the statute was silent
as to the authority of heirs to renounce a bequest for a
decedent. In addition, the court held that the disclaimer
was not effective because the decedent had received some
of the benefits of the bequest when a portion of the
decedent’s nursing home expenses were paid from the
account in the name of the predeceased spouse. Est. of
DeLaune v. United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,266 (M.D. La. 1997).
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer wanted to set up a
son in business and formed a new corporation,
contributing $5,000 in exchange for 51 percent of the
shares of the company, with the other 49 issued in the
son’s name. The taxpayer then issued a “counterletter”
which stated that all of the stock was actually owned by
the son and that the taxpayer was listed as owner only to
make use of the taxpayer’s business reputation for the new
corporation. The counterletter was effective under local
law to vest the son with ownership rights in the stock. Full
title was conveyed several years later and the IRS argued
that a gift occurred at that time because the taxpayer did
not relinquish control over the stock and the corporation
until that time. The court held that, because the
counterletter was effective under local law to transfer all
rights in the stock to the son, the gift was completed upon
issuance of the letter. Autin v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,265 (5th Cir. 1997).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].*
Senator Lugar has introduced S. 549 which would allow,
without causing recapture of special use valuation
benefits, a qualified heir to cash rent special use valuation
property to a member of the decedent’s family or the
decedent’s spouse’s family if “such member uses such
property in a qualified use.” Query: what does the quoted
language mean?
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The IRS has issued the 1997 list of average annual
effective interest rates charged on new loans by the Farm
Credit Bank system to be used in computing the value of
real property for special use valuation purposes:
   District    Interest rate  
Columbia 8.88
Omaha 8.09
Sacramento 8.49
St. Paul 8.39
Spokane 8.27
Springfield 8.57
Texas 8.42
Wichita 8.21
Rev. Rul. 97-13, I.R.B. 1997-__.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer transferred three parcels of
land, including one parcel containing the residence and
two parcels with associated buildings. The taxpayer was
the beneficiary of the trusts for a set number of years, after
which the taxpayer had the option to lease the properties
from the trust for fair rental value. The IRS ruled that the
trust was a Qualified Personal Residence Trust and if the
taxpayer survived the term of the trust, the trust corpus
would not be included in the taxpayer’s estate. Ltr. Rul.
9714025, Jan. 6, 1997.
VALUATION. The decedent had been the beneficiary
of two trusts, a revocable trust and a marital trust
established at the death of the decedent’s pre-deceased
spouse. The decedent’s two heirs were the trustees of both
trusts. Two days before the decedent’s death and when the
decedent was known to be terminally ill, the trustees
transferred the trusts’ assets to a new limited partnership
in exchange for limited partnership interests. The heirs
then each purchased 30 percent interests in the partnership
in exchange for promissory notes. The purchase left the
estate with minority interests in the partnership and the
estate decreased the value of the partnerships for estate tax
purposes, using a minority discount. The transactions did
not affect each heir’s share of the estate which was
acquired at the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that the
estate would not be allowed a minority discount for the
value of the partnership interests because the transactions
were done only to create a valuation discount and had no
valid business purpose. Unpublished T.A.M.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer made advances of cash to
two interrelated companies. The advances were evidenced
by notes which contained interest rates and maturity dates
but did not set a repayment schedule. The notes were not
produced at trial, nor were any other corroborating records
of the taxpayer. The court held that, without any
supporting records or copies of the notes, the mere
testimony of the taxpayer that the advances were loans and
not capital contributions was not credible; therefore, the
court held that no business bad deduction was allowed for
the advances. Pyron v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-178.
CASUALTY LOSSES. The President has declared
certain areas of West Virginia as disaster areas from Feb.
28, 1997 storms and areas of Illinois as disaster areas from
storms and flooding beginning on March 1, 1997. Losses
from these casualties may be deducted in taxpayers’ 1996
returns.
The IRS has announced that uninsured casualty losses
from the floods in North and South Dakota may be
claimed on taxpayers’ 1996 returns. IR-97-21.
EMPLOYER. The taxpayer owned farm land which
was rented on a cropshare basis to several tenants.
Because the tenants did not have sufficient funds to pay
any employees during the crop year, the taxpayer paid all
wages for the employees and deducted the payments from
the tenants’ share of the crop at the end of the year. The
IRS assessed unpaid FICA and FUTA taxes against the
taxpayer as the employer of the tenants’ employees. The
taxpayer argued that the tenants were the employees for
purposes of payment of FICA and FUTA taxes because
the tenants controlled the employees. The IRS argued that
I.R.C. § 3401(d) was clear that whoever controlled the
payment of wages was considered the employer for FICA
and FUTA purposes. The court held that the taxpayer was
the employer for FICA and FUTA purposes. Winstead v.
United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,322 (4th
Cir. 1997).
PARTNERSHIP-ALM § 7.03.*
DEFINITION.  The IRS assessed the taxpayer for
employment taxes not paid on amounts paid to a person
who worked in the taxpayer’s business. The taxpayer
argued that the person was a partner in the business and
received a share of the partnership profits. The court found
that the employee did not have any right to the business
books and had no authority to write checks and that the
taxpayer had not filed any federal partnership income tax
returns, had not registered the business as a partnership
with the state and had represented to the IRS in earlier
audits that the business was not a partnership. The court
held that the worker was an employee and that the
taxpayer was liable for the employment taxes on the
amounts paid to the worker. In re Boyd, 97-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,324 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1997).
SALE OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST. Under the
partnership agreement, upon the death or withdrawal of a
partner which did not cause a dissolution and termination
of the partnership, the remaining partners were to purchase
the withdrawing partner’s interest. The payments were the
personal liability of the remaining partners and the
withdrawing partner or the decedent partner’s estate was
prohibited from seeking any deficiency from the
partnership or the other partners if any one partner failed
to make the required payments. The payments were fixed
in part, calculated as the partner’s capital account plus a
fixed cash amount plus any previous amounts paid by the
partner to another withdrawing partner. The payments also
included an amount contingent upon the net profits of the
partnership. The IRS ruled (1) the withdrawal payments
constituted a sale of the withdrawing partner’s interest
under I.R.C. § 741; (2) under Treas. Reg. § 1.706-
1(c)(3)(v), the portion of the distributive share of
partnership income that was attributable to the decedent
ending with the date of the decedent’s death was income
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in respect of decedent, including payments made by the
remaining partners which would have been income in
respect of decedent had the items been owned directly by
the deceased partner; and (3) contingent payments made
by remaining partners increased that partner’s basis in the
partnership interest to the extent treated as principal. Ltr.
Rul. 9715008, Dec. 4, 1996.
RETURNS. Under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub.
L. No. 104-168, § 1210, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) the “timely
mailing as timely filing/paying” rule of I.R.C. § 7502(a)
can be met by using designated private delivery service
instead of the U.S. Postal Service. The IRS has announced
the designation of four private delivery services: (1)
Airborne Express: Overnight Air Express Service, Next
Afternoon Service and Second Day Service; (2) DHL
Worldwide Express: DHL “Same Day” Service and DHL
USA Overnight; (3) Federal Express: FedEx Priority
Overnight, FedEx Standard Overnight and FedEx 2Day;
and (4) United Parcel Service: UPS Next day Air, Next
Day Air Saver, UPS 2d Day Air and UPS 2d Day Air
A.M. Notice 97-26, I.R.B. 1997-__, _.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The taxpayer was a corporation which
wanted to make the S corporation election for a tax year.
The corporation filled out Form 2553 and gave the form to
its attorney for filing with the IRS; however, the attorney
failed to file the form in time to allow the S corporation
election to be effective for the tax year desired. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer had established reasonable cause
for the failure to timely file the election; therefore, the
taxpayer was allowed to file as an S corporation as of the
originally intended tax year. Ltr. Rul. 9715021, Jan. 10,
1997.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers, husband and
wife, owned a residence and sought to purchase a new
residence. The taxpayers had difficulty financing the
second house because the first house was unsold. The
taxpayers had the husband’s parents purchase the new
house. The title to the new house was in the parents’ name
and the parents obtained a mortgage loan for the purchase.
The taxpayers reimbursed the parents for all payments on
the mortgage. The taxpayers sold their first house in the
same tax year to the husband’s parents and used a portion
of the proceeds to establish a fund from which the
mortgage payments were made to the parents for the
second house. More than two years later, the parents
transferred the second house to the taxpayers as a gift. The
court held that the taxpayers were not eligible for rollover
of the gain from the sale of their first house because they
did not acquire title to the second house until more than
two years later when the second house was given to them.
The court focused on the facts that the parents had title to
the second house and were liable on the mortgage and that
none of the sale documents mentioned anything about the
parents acting as agents for the taxpayers in acquiring the
house. De Ocampo v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-161.
The taxpayers purchased unimproved land with the
intent to build a residence on the land. The taxpayers were
unable to fund the construction and the land was sold with
only the foundation of the house completed. The taxpayers
were over the age of 55 and sought to exclude gain from
the sale under I.R.C. § 121. The court held that no
exclusion was allowed because the land was never used as
the taxpayers’ primary residence. Vidaurre v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1997-164.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME. In Harl, “Renting
Land to Family Entity,” 7 Agric. Law Dig. 157 (1996),
Mizell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-571 and Ltr. Rul.
9637004, May 1, 1996, were discussed. The case provided
that self-employment income tax was incurred on rental
income from a non-material participation crop share lease
to a family farm partnership in which the landowner was a
25 percent partner and required, under the partnership
agreement but not the lease, to participate in the
partnership operations. The ruling involved a cash rent
lease to a corporaiton. In both, the IRS had focused on
language in I.R.C. § 1402 which included in material
participation an arrangement between the landowner and
tenant which required the material participation of the
landowner in the farm operation. Senators Grassley and
Grams have introduced S. 529, the “Farm Independence
Act of 1997,” which amends I.R.C. § 1402 to change the
term “an arrangement” to “a lease agreement.” In remarks
concerning the legislation, Senators Grassley and Grams
clarify that the legislation is intended to limit the scope of
IRS investigation of required material participation by the
landlord to the terms of the lease. 97 ARD 072-13 (CCH).
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. The taxpayers
sought a refund of income taxes paid on social security
benefits, arguing that the imposition of tax was
unconstitutional (1) as a tax levied without apportionment
according to population, (2) under the doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity, and (3) as too indefinite
and vague. The court rejected the taxpayers’ arguments
and upheld the tax, under I.R.C. § 86, of social security
benefits. Lansden v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,319 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned an airplane used 90 percent in
the corporation’s business. The corporation used the
airplane to transport an officer-shareholder to and from a
vacation site where no corporation business was
transacted. The corporation deducted all costs of the
airplane as business expenses and included the costs of the
transportation of the officer-shareholder to the vacation
site as wages subject to withholding. The IRS ruled that,
under I.R.C. § 274(e)(2), the corporation could deduct the
airplane expenses for the vacation trips only to the extent
the costs were included in the taxable compensation of the
officer-shareholder. Ltr. Rul. 9715001, Oct. 31, 1996.
TRUSTS. The IRS has issued a warning to taxpayers
to avoid abusive trust arrangements that are promoted as
allowing tax benefits without changing the control or true
ownership of the taxpayer’s assets, including income. The
IRS noted that abusive trusts are being actively examined
under National Compliance, Fiduciary and Special
Projects and may subject taxpayers and promoters to civil
and/or criminal penalties. Taxpayers should be aware of
arrangements that make personal living expenses
deductible or that make transfers to family members
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deductible as charitable contributions. Notice 97-24,
I.R.B. 1997-16.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
LEASE. The property involved in this case was
originally owned by the grandparents of the defendant.
The grandparents had entered into leases with the tenants
and, when the grandparents died, the parent as executor of
the estate entered into a lease with the tenant for 20 years.
The tenants failed to produce a signed copy of this lease
but had an unsigned copy and claimed to have made
advance payments of $30,000 toward the 20 year lease
payments. The parent died and the defendants pledged the
farm as security for a loan. When the defendants defaulted
on the loan, the creditor sought to foreclose against the
property. The tenant argued that the lease took priority
over the security interest or that the tenant was entitled to
damages for loss of profits over the normal term of the
lease and for return of advance lease payments. The
creditor argued that the grandparent had no authority to
enter into the lease because the grandparent was restricted
by the probate court to first obtain court permission before
any conveyance of the property. The tenant argued that a
lease was not a conveyance and was allowable without
prior probate court consent.  The court held that although
the term “convey” was ambiguous, under either
interpretation, a summary judgment for the creditor was
improper because the tenants may not have had notice of
the restriction on the grandparent’s authority to make the
lease. The court also reversed summary judgment for the
creditor on the issue of unjust enrichment in that the
tenants had presented sufficient evidence that advance
payments may have been made. AgAmerica v. Westgate,
931 P.2d 1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997).
PROPERTY
PARTITION. The plaintiff claimed a one-half interest
in a farm occupied by the defendants. The defendants
claimed ownership of the entire farm through adverse
possession. The plaintiffs filed the current action for
partition of the property and the trial court ruled that the
plaintiff owned a one-half interest in the farm and ordered
the partitioning of the property. The defendants argued
that, because the defendants claimed title by adverse
possession, the plaintiffs were first required to obtain a
judgment of ejection before a partition could be ordered.
The court held that an action for ejectment was
unnecessary where the trial court determined that the
plaintiffs had an interest in the property. Greene v.
Pearson, 937 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
LIVESTOCK EXHIBITIONS. The plaintiff had
entered a steer in the Junior Livestock Division at the
Ohio State Fair. The steer was sold as part of that
competition and was slaughtered and tested. The steer was
found to have vegetable oil in its carcass and the plaintiff
was notified that the entry was disqualified for tampering.
The plaintiff was required to return the proceeds of the
sale and was barred from competition in the next three
state fairs. The defendant commission provided the
plaintiff with a hearing on the notification ad
disqualification. The plaintiff was allowed to be
represented by counsel and the state department of
agriculture was represented by counsel who assisted the
attorney general’s office in the hearing. The commission
did not change its ruling after the hearing and the plaintiff
sought judicial review. The commission argued that the
court had no jurisdiction, under Ohio Rev. Code Chapter
119, because the commission was not listed as an agency
subject to that chapter nor did the commission conduct the
hearing under that chapter. The court agreed, holding that
without express statutory authority for applying Chapter
119 to the commission, the court had no review
jurisdiction over the disqualification ruling. Abt v. Ohio
Expositions Comm’n, 675 N.E. 2d 43 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996).
TRESPASS
DAMAGES. The defendant had negligently cut timber
on the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff discovered the cutting
before the logs were removed, repossessed the logs and
sold them. The trial court calculated damages by using the
sale price of the logs as the fair market value of the trees
and doubling that amount. The court then reduced the
damage award by the proceeds of the sale of the logs,
decreased by the income tax paid on the proceeds,
increased by the costs to the plaintiff to clean up the
logging site, and decreased by the costs incurred by the
defendant in cutting the trees. Under Wis. Stat. § 26.09,
the plaintiff was entitled to double “the amount of
damages suffered.” The plaintiff argued that the term
“amount of damages suffered” referred solely to the
market value of the trees cut, without adjustment for the
costs of the cutting. The court examined the legislative
history to resolve the ambiguity in the statute and held that
the statute intended that the damages be determined as the
actual amount of loss of the plaintiff, determined by
adjusting the award of double the fair market value of the
trees by any recovery made by the plaintiff and the costs
of cutting the trees incurred by the defendant. Tydrich v.
Bonkamp, 558 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
WATER
UNDERGROUND STREAMS. The plaintiffs owned
farm land adjacent to land owned by the defendant which
operated a gravel quarry on the land. An underground
spring flowed from the defendant’s land through the
plaintiff’s land and was used by the plaintiffs as a source
of water. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s quarry
activity caused an underground spring to dry up. The trial
court had granted the defendant summary judgment, ruling
that no action could lie where the defendant was pursuing
a lawful activity on the land. The appellate court reversed,
holding that persons who benefit from a subterranean
watercourse have a public or natural easement to the
uninterrupted use of the watercourse and that an upstream
landowner may not stop or divert the watercourse, even
through lawful use of the property. Maddocks v. Giles,
686 A.2d 1069 (Me. 1996).
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SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS
PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class
seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil
E. Harl.  The seminar is scheduled for January 5-9, 1998
on the Big Island, Hawai'i.
Watch this space and your mail for more details or call
Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
        
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to
keep the Manual current with the latest developments.
After the first free update, additional updates will be billed
at $100 per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
ISSUE INDEX
Animals
Horses 66
Bankruptcy
General
Exemptions
  Homestead 66
Grain storage facility 66
Federal taxation
Discharge 67
Dismissal 67
Estate property 67
Jurisdiction 67
Setoff 67
Federal Agricultural Programs
Crop insurance 67
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Charitable deduction 68
Disclaimers 68
Gift 68
Special use valuation 68
Trusts 69
Valuation 69
Federal Income Taxation
Bad debts 69
Casualty losses 69
Employer 69
Partnerships
Definition 69
Sale of partnership interest 69
Returns 70
S corporations
Election 70
Sale of residence 70
Self-employment income 70
Social security benefits  70
Travel expenses 70
Trusts 70
Landlord and Tenant
Lease 71
Property
Partition 71
State Regulation of Agriculture
Livestock exhibitions 71
Trespass
Damages 71
Water
Underground streams 71
